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Abstract. We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual
preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who
plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative
symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study α-approximate k-equilibria
of these games, i.e., outcomes where no group of at most k players can
deviate such that each member increases his payoff by at least a factor
α. We prove that for α ≥ 2 these games have the finite coalitional im-
provement property (and thus α-approximate k-equilibria exist), while
for α < 2 this property does not hold. Further, we derive an almost
tight bound of 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1) on the price of anarchy, where n is the
number of players; in particular, it scales from unbounded for pure Nash
equilibria (k = 1) to 2α for strong equilibria (k = n). We also settle the
complexity of several problems related to the verification and existence
of these equilibria. Finally, we investigate natural means to reduce the
inefficiency of Nash equilibria. Most promisingly, we show that by fixing
the strategies of k players the price of anarchy can be reduced to n/k
(and this bound is tight).
1 Introduction
In this paper, we are interested in strategic games where the players are as-
sociated with the nodes of a graph and can benefit from coordinating their
choices with their neighbors. More specifically, we consider polymatrix coordi-
nation games with individual preferences : We are given an undirected graph
G = (N,E) on the set of players (nodes) N := {1, . . . , n}. Every player i ∈ N
has a finite set of strategies Si to choose from and an individual preference func-
tion qi : Si → R+. Each player i ∈ N plays a separate bimatrix game with
each of his neighbors in Ni := {j ∈ N | {i, j} ∈ E}. In particular, every edge
{i, j} ∈ E is associated with a payoff function qij : Si × Sj → R+, specifying a
non-negative payoff qij(si, sj) that both i and j receive if they choose strategies
si and sj , respectively. Given a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn) of all players, the
overall payoff of player i is defined as
pi(s) := q
i(si) +
∑
j∈Ni
qij(si, sj). (1)
These games naturally model situations in which each player has individual
preferences over the available options (possibly not having access to all options)
and may benefit in varying degrees from coordinating with his neighbors. For
example, one might think of students deciding which language to learn, co-
workers choosing which project to work on, or friends determining which mobile
phone provider to use. On the other hand, these games also capture situations
where players prefer to anti-coordinate, e.g., competing firms profiting equally
by choosing different markets.
A special case of our games are polymatrix coordination games (without indi-
vidual preferences, i.e., qi = 0 for all i) which have previously been investigated
by Cai and Daskalakis [9]. Among other results, the authors show that pure
Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, but that finding one is PLS-complete.
Polymatrix coordination games capture several other well-studied games among
which are party affiliation games [6], cut games [11] and congestion games with
positive externalities [12].
Yet another special case which will be of interest in this paper are graph
coordination games. Here every edge {i, j} ∈ E is associated with a non-negative
edge weight wij and the payoff function q
ij is simply defined as qij(si, sj) = wij
if si = sj and q
ij(si, sj) = 0 otherwise. Intuitively, in this game every player
(node) i ∈ N chooses a color si from the set of colors Si available to him and
receives a payoff equal to the total weight of all incident edges to neighbors
choosing the same color. These games have recently been studied by Apt et al.
[2] for the special case of unit edge weights.
This paper is devoted to the study of equilibria in polymatrix coordination
games with individual preferences. It is not hard to see that these games always
admit pure Nash equilibria. However, in general these equilibria are highly ineffi-
cient. One of the most prominent notions to assess the inefficiency of equilibria is
the price of anarchy [13]. It is defined as the ratio in social welfare of an optimal
outcome and a worst-case equilibrium. Here the social welfare of a joint strategy
s refers to the sum of the payoffs of all players, i.e., SW(s) =
∑
i∈N pi(s).
The high inefficiency of our games even arises in the special case of graph
coordination games as has recently been shown in [2]. To see this, fix an arbitrary
graph G = (N,E) with unit edge weights and suppose each player i ∈ N can
choose between a private color ci and a common color c. Then each player
i choosing his private color ci constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which every
player has a payoff of zero. In contrast, if every player chooses the common color
c then each player i obtains his maximum payoff equal to the degree of i. As
a consequence, the price of anarchy is unbounded. The example demonstrates
that the players might be unable to coordinate on the (obviously better) common
choice because they cannot escape from a bad initial configuration by unilateral
deviations. In particular, observe that the example breaks if two (or more) players
can deviate simultaneously. This suggests that one should consider more refined
equilibrium notions where deviations of groups of players are allowed.
In our studies, we focus on a general equilibrium notion which allows us to
differentiate between both varying sizes of coalitional deviations and different
degrees of player reluctance to deviate. More specifically, in this paper we con-
sider α-approximate k-equilibria as the solution concept, i.e., outcomes that are
Problem Complexity
Verification (α, k)-equilibrium (k constant) P
(α, k)-equilibrium (α fixed) co-NP-complete
α-approximate strong equilibrium P
Existence k-equilibrium (k ≥ 2 fixed) NP-complete
strong equilibrium NP-complete†
Table 1. Complexity of graph coordination games. The parameters α and k are as-
sumed to be part of the input unless they are stated to be fixed. † Shown to be efficiently
computable for forests.
resilient to deviations of at most k players such that each member increases his
payoff by at least a factor of α ≥ 1. Subsequently, we call these equilibria also
(α, k)-equilibria for short. In light of this refined equilibrium notion, several nat-
ural questions arise and will be answered in this paper: Which are the precise
values of α and k that guarantee the existence of (α, k)-equilibria? What is the
price of anarchy of these equilibria as a function of α and k? How about the
complexity of problems related to the verification and existence of such equilib-
ria? And finally, are there efficient coordination mechanisms to reduce the price
of anarchy?
Our contributions. We study (α, k)-equilibria of graph and polymatrix coordi-
nation games. Our main contributions are summarized below.
1. Existence: We prove that for α ≥ 2 polymatrix coordination games have
the finite (α, k)-improvement property, i.e., every sequence of α-improving
k-deviations is finite (and thus results in an (α, k)-equilibrium). We also
exhibit an example showing that for α < 2 this property does not hold in
general. For graph coordination games we show that if the underlying graph
is a tree then (α, k)-equilibria exist for every α and k. On the other hand, if
the graph is a pseudotree (i.e., a tree with exactly one cycle) the existence
of (α, k)-equilibria cannot be guaranteed for every α < ϕ and k ≥ 2, where
ϕ = 12 (1 +
√
5) is the golden ratio.
2. Inefficiency: We show that the price of anarchy of (α, k)-equilibria for poly-
matrix coordination games is at most 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1). We also provide a
lower bound of 2α(n−1)/(k−1)+1−2α. In particular, the price of anarchy
drops from unbounded for pure Nash equilibria (k = 1) to 2α for strong
equilibria (k = n), both of which are tight bounds.
3. Complexity: We settle the complexity of several problems related to the
verification and existence of (α, k)-equilibria in graph coordination games.
Naturally all hardness results extend to the more general class of polymatrix
coordination games with individual preferences. A summary of our results is
given in Table 1.
4. Coordination mechanisms: We investigate two natural mechanisms that a
central coordinator might deploy to reduce the price of anarchy of pure
Nash equilibria: (i) asymmetric sharing of the common payoffs qij and (ii)
strategy imposition of a limited number of players. Concerning (i), we show
that there is no payoff distribution rule that reduces the price of anarchy in
general. As to (ii), we prove that by (temporarily) fixing the strategies of k
players according to an arbitrarily given joint strategy s, the resulting Nash
equilibrium recovers at least a fraction of k/n of the social welfare SW(s) and
this is best possible. Exploiting this in combination with a 2-approximation
algorithm for the optimal social welfare problem [12], we derive an efficient
algorithm to reduce the price of anarchy to at most 2n/k for a special class
of polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences.
Related work. Apt et al. [2] study k-equilibria in graph coordination games with
unit edge weights, which constitute a special case of our games. They identify
several graph structural properties that ensure the existence of such equilibria.
Interestingly, most of these results do not carry over to our weighted graph
coordination games, therefore demanding for the new approach of considering
approximate equilibria.
Many of the mentioned games have been studied from a computational com-
plexity point of view. In particular, Cai and Daskalakis [9] show that the problem
of finding a pure Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix coordination game is PLS-
complete. Further, they show that finding a mixed Nash equilibrium is in PPAD
∩ PLS. While this suggests that the latter problem is unlikely to be hard, it is
not known whether it is in P. It is easy to see that these results also carry over
to our polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences.3
For the special case of party affiliation games efficient algorithms to compute
an approximate Nash equilibrium are known [7,10]. The current best approxi-
mation guarantee is 3 + ε, where ε > 0, due to Caragiannis, Fanelli and Gavin
[10]. The algorithm crucially exploits that party affiliation games admit an exact
potential whose relative gap (called stretch) between any two Nash equilibria is
bounded by 2. The latter property is not satisfied in our games, even for graph
coordination games (as the example outlined in the Introduction shows).
A class of games that is closely related to our graph coordination games are
additively separable hedonic games [8]. As in our games, the players are embedded
in a weighted graph. Every player chooses a coalition and receives as payoff
the total weight of all edges to neighbors in the same coalition. These games
were originally studied in a cooperative game theory setting. More recently,
researchers also address computational issues of these games (see, e.g., [4]). It is
important to note that in hedonic games every player can choose every coalition,
while in our graph coordination games players may only have limited options.
Anshelevich and Sekar [1] study coordination games with individual prefer-
ences where the players are nodes in a graph and profit from neighbors choosing
the same color. However, in their setting the edge weight between two neighbors
can be distributed asymmetrically and all players are assumed to have the same
strategy set. Among other results, they give an algorithm to compute a (2, n)-
3 In [9] the bimatrix games on the edges may have negative payoffs and this is exploited
in the PLS-completeness proof. However, we can accommodate this in our model by
adding a sufficiently large constant to each payoff.
equilibrium and show how to efficiently compute an approximate equilibrium
that is not too far from the optimal social welfare.
Concerning the social welfare optimization problem, a 2-approximation algo-
rithm is given in [12] for the special case of polymatrix coordination games with
individual preferences where the bimatrix game of each edge has positive entries
only on the diagonal.
Our techniques. Most of our existence results use a generalized potential function
argument for coalitional deviations. In our proof of the upper bound on the
inefficiency of (α, k)-equilibria we first argue locally for a fixed coalition of players
and then use a sandwich bound in combination with a counting argument to
derive the upper bound. Most of our lower bounds and hardness results follow by
exploiting specific properties and deep structural insights of graph coordination
games with edge weights.
It is worth mentioning that our algorithm to compute a strong equilibrium for
graph coordination games on trees reveals a surprising connection to a sequential-
move version of the game. In particular, we show that if we fix an arbitrary root
of the tree and consider the induced sequential-move game then every subgame
perfect equilibrium corresponds to a strong equilibrium of the original game. As a
consequence, strong equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently. Further, this
in combination with our strong price of anarchy bound shows that the sequential
price of anarchy [14] for these induced games is at most 2, which is a significant
improvement over the unbounded price of anarchy for the strategic-form version
of the game. This result is of independent interest.
We also note that the k/n bound on the social welfare which is guaranteed
by our strategy imposition algorithm is proven via a smoothness argument [16].
Besides some other consequences, this implies that our bound also holds for more
permissive solution concepts such as correlated and coarse correlated equilibria
(see [16] for more details).
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (G, (Si)i∈N , (qi)i∈N , (qij){i,j}∈E) be a polymatrix coordination game
with individual preferences (w.i.p.) where G = (N,E) is the underlying graph.
Recall that we identify the player set N with {1, . . . , n}. We first introduce some
standard game-theoretic concepts.
We call a subset K := {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ N of players a coalition of size k. We
define the set of joint strategies of players in K as SK := Si1 × · · · × Sik and
use S := SN to refer to the set of joint strategies of all players. Given a joint
strategy s ∈ S, we use sK to refer to (si1 , . . . , sik) and s−K to refer to (si)i/∈K .
By slightly abusing notation, we also write (sK , s−K) instead of s. If there is a
strategy x such that si = x for every player i ∈ K, we also write s = (xK , s−K).
Given a joint strategy s and a coalition K, we say that s′ = (s′K , s−K) is a
deviation of coalition K from s if s′i 6= si for every player i ∈ K; we also denote
this by s→K s′. If we constrain to deviations of coalitions of size at most k, we
call such deviations k-deviations. We call a deviation α-improving if every player
in the coalition improves his payoff by at least a factor of α ≥ 1, i.e., for every
i ∈ K, pi(s′) > αpi(s); we also call such deviations (α, k)-improving. We omit
the explicit mentioning of the parameters if α = 1 or k = 1. A joint strategy
s is an α-approximate k-equilibrium (also called (α, k)-equilibrium for short) if
there is no (α, k)-improving deviation from s. If k = 1 or k = n then we also
refer to the respective equilibrium notion as α-approximate Nash equilibrium
and α-approximate strong equilibrium [3].
We say that a finite strategic game has the finite (α, k)-improvement property
(or (α, k)-FIP for short) if every sequence of (α, k)-improving deviations is finite.
This notion generalizes the finite improvement property introduced by Monderer
[15] for α = k = 1. A function Φ : S → R is called an (α, k)-generalized potential
if for every joint strategy s, for every (α, k)-improving deviation s′ := (s′K , s−K)
from s it holds that Φ(s′) > Φ(s). It is not hard to see that if a finite game
admits an (α, k)-generalized potential then it has the (α, k)-FIP.
The social welfare of a joint strategy s is defined as SW(s) :=
∑
i∈N pi(s).
For K ⊆ N , we define SWK(s) :=
∑
i∈K pi(s). A joint strategy s
∗ of maximum
social welfare is called a social optimum. Given a finite game that has an (α, k)-
equilibrium, its (α, k)-price of anarchy (POA) is the ratio SW(s∗)/SW(s), where
s∗ is a social optimum and s is an (α, k)-equilibrium of smallest social welfare. In
the case of division by zero, we interpret the outcome as ∞. Note that if α′ ≥ α
and k′ ≤ k, then every (α, k)-equilibrium is an (α′, k′)-equilibrium. Hence the
(α, k)-PoA lower bounds the (α′, k′)-PoA.
Due to lack of space, several proofs are omitted from the main part of this
paper and can be found in the appendix.
3 Existence
We first give a characterization of the values α and k for which our polymatrix
coordination games with individual preferences have the (α, k)-FIP.
Theorem 1. Let G be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. Then:
1. G has the (α, 1)-FIP for every α.
2. G has the (α, k)-FIP for every α ≥ 2 and for every k.
Proof. Observe that every α-improving deviation is also α′-improving for α ≥ α′.
It is thus sufficient to prove the claims above for α = 1 and α = 2, respectively.
In order to prove the first claim we prove that the game admits an exact
potential and thus has the FIP; details are given in Appendix A.
We next prove the second claim for α = 2 by showing that Φ(s) := SW(s) is
a (2, k)-generalized potential. Given a joint strategy s and two sets K,K ′ ⊆ N ,
define
Qs(K,K
′) :=
∑
i∈K, j∈Ni∩K′
qij(s) and Qs(K) :=
∑
i∈K
qi(s).
Consider a (2, k)-improving deviation s′ = (s′K , s−K) from s. Let K¯ be the
complement of K. We have SWK(s) = Qs(K,K) + Qs(K, K¯) + Qs(K). Note
that SWK(s
′) > 2SWK(s) because the deviation is 2-improving. Thus,
Qs′(K,K) +Qs′(K, K¯) +Qs′(K) > 2
(
Qs(K,K) +Qs(K, K¯) +Qs(K)
)
. (2)
The social welfare of s can be written as
SW(s) = Qs(K,K) + 2Qs(K, K¯) +Qs(K¯, K¯) +Qs(K) +Qs(K¯).
Note that Qs(K¯, K¯) = Qs′(K¯, K¯) and Qs(K¯) = Qs′(K¯). Using (2), we obtain
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) = Qs′(K,K) + 2Qs′(K, K¯) +Qs′(K)
−Qs(K,K)− 2Qs(K, K¯)−Qs(K)
> Qs(K,K) +Qs′(K, K¯) +Qs(K) ≥ 0.
Thus Φ(s) is a (2, k)-generalized potential which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
The next theorem shows that in general our polymatrix coordination games
do not have the (α, k)-FIP for α < 2.
Theorem 2. For all α < 2 there is a polymatrix coordination game G that has
a cycle of (α, n− 1)-improving deviations.
We derive some more refined insights for the special case of graph coordina-
tion games.
Theorem 3. The following holds for graph coordination games:
1. Let G be a graph coordination game on a tree. Then G has a strong equilib-
rium.
2. There is a graph coordination game G on a graph with one cycle such that no
(α, k)-equilibrium exists for every α < ϕ and k ≥ 2, where ϕ := 12 (1+
√
5) ≈
1.62 is the golden ratio.
Note that Theorem 3 shows that for k ≥ 2 a k-equilibrium may not exist.
In contrast, Nash equilibria always exist by Theorem 1. Further, the graph used
to show the second claim is a pseudoforest4. For graph coordination games with
unit edge weights, this guarantees the existence of a strong equilibrium [2].
4 Inefficiency
We analyze the price of anarchy of our polymatrix coordination games. The
upper bound in the special case of (α, k) = (1, n) follows from a result in [5].
Theorem 4. The (α, k)-price of anarchy in polymatrix coordination games
w.i.p. is between 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1) + 1 − 2α and 2α(n− 1)/(k − 1). The upper
bound of 2α is tight for α-approximate strong equilibria.
4 A graph is a pseudoforest if each of its connected components has at most one cycle.
Proof (upper bound). Let s be an (α, k)-equilibrium (which we assume to exist)
and let s∗ be a social optimum. Fix an arbitrary coalition K = {i1, . . . , ik} of
size k. Then there is a player i ∈ K such that pi(s∗K , s−K) ≤ αpi(s). Denote by
pKi (s
∗) := qi(s∗) +
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗) the total payoff that i gets from players in
K under s∗ (including himself). Because all payoffs are non-negative, we have
pKi (s
∗) ≤ qi(s∗i ) +
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗i , s
∗
j ) +
∑
j∈Ni∩K¯
qij(s∗i , sj) = pi(s
∗
K , s−K). (3)
Thus, pKi (s
∗) ≤ αpi(s). Rename the nodes in K such that ik = i and repeat the
arguments above with K \ {ik} instead of K. Continuing this way, we obtain
that for every player ix ∈ K, p{i1,...,ix}ix (s∗) ≤ αpix(s).
We thus have
∑
i∈K
(
qi(s∗) +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗)
)
=
k∑
x=1
p
{i1,...,ix}
ix
(s∗) ≤ α
∑
i∈K
pi(s)
Summing over all coalitions K of size k, we obtain
∑
K:|K|=k
(∑
i∈K
(
qi(s∗) +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗)
))
≤ α
∑
K:|K|=k
∑
i∈K
pi(s). (4)
Consider the right-hand side of (4). Note that every player i ∈ N occurs
in
(
n−1
k−1
)
many coalitions of size k because we can choose k − 1 out of n − 1
remaining players to form a coalition of size k containing i. Thus
∑
K:|K|=k
∑
i∈K
pi(s) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)∑
i∈N
pi(s) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
SW(s). (5)
Similarly, the first term of the left-hand side of (4) yields
∑
K:|K|=k
∑
i∈K
qi(s∗) =
(
n− 1
k − 1
)∑
i∈N
qi(s∗) ≥ 1
2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)∑
i∈N
qi(s∗).
Now, consider the second term of the left-hand side of (4). Every pair (i, j)
with i ∈ N and j ∈ Ni occurs in
(
n−2
k−2
)
many coalitions of size k because we
can choose k− 2 out of n− 2 remaining players to complete a coalition of size k
containing both i and j. Thus for the left-hand side of (4) we obtain
∑
K:|K|=k
(∑
i∈K
(
qi(s∗) +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni∩K
qij(s∗)
))
≥ 1
2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)(∑
i∈N
qi(s∗) +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni
qij(s∗)
)
=
1
2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
SW(s∗). (6)
Combining (5) and (6) with inequality (4), we obtain that the (α, k)-price of
anarchy is at most 2α
(
n−1
k−1
)
/
(
n−2
k−2
)
= 2αn−1k−1 . ⊓⊔
5 Complexity
In this section, we study the complexity of various computational problems on
graph coordination games.
Theorem 5. Let G be a graph coordination game. Given a joint strategy s, the
problem of deciding whether s is an (α, k)-equilibrium
1. is in P , if k = O(1) or k = n;
2. is co-NP-complete for every fixed α.
Proof (sketch). We sketch the proof of the first claim for k = n. A crucial insight
is that if there is an α-improving deviation from s then there is one which is
simple, i.e., s′ = (s′K , s−K) where the subgraph G[K] induced by K is connected
and all nodes in K deviate to the same color s′K = x for some x (see Lemma 1).
Fix some color x and let Gx := (Nx, Ex) be the subgraph of G induced by the
set of nodes Nx that can choose color x but do not do so in s. For each u ∈ Nx
define du := αpu(s) − w({{u, v} ∈ E | sj = x}) − qu(x). Now, a deviation of
a coalition K ⊆ Nx to (xK , s−K) is α-improving if and only if for every node
u ∈ K the total weight of all incident edges in the induced subgraph Gx[K] is
larger than du. We prove that an inclusionwise maximal K ⊆ Nx satisfying this
property can be found in polynomial time. This way we can verify for every color
x whether an α-improving deviation exists. ⊓⊔
Deciding whether a graph coordination game admits a k-equilibrium is hard
for every k ≥ 2. Note that for unit edge weights 2-equilibria are guaranteed to
exist and can be found efficiently, as shown in [2].
Theorem 6. Let G be a graph coordination game. Then the problem of deciding
whether there is a k-equilibrium is NP-complete for every fixed k ≥ 2.
Proof (k = 2). We give a reduction from minimum maximal matching which
is known to be NP-complete [17]: Given a graph G = (V,E) and a number l,
does there exist an inclusionwise maximal matching of size at most l?
Let (G, l) be an instance of this problem with G = (V,E) and n = |V |. We
add n − 2l gadgets H1, . . . , Hn−2l to G, where an illustration of gadget Hi is
given in Figure 1. The dashed edge from vi0 to G indicates that v
i
0 is connected
to all vertices in G and each of these edges has weight 3. We assign to each node
v ∈ V the color set Sv = {xiv | i = 1, . . . , n− 2l} ∪ {ye | e = {v, w} ∈ E}, i.e., v
can either choose a ‘gadget color’ xiv or a color corresponding to some adjacent
edge in E. Every edge in E has weight 4. Note that for all joint strategies of
nodes in V the set of unicolor edges in E constitutes a matching. The idea is
that in every 2-equilibrium n−2l nodes in V are needed to ‘stabilize’ the gadgets
and the 2l remaining nodes in V form a maximal matching.
Assume that G has a maximal matching M ⊆ E with |M | ≤ l. We construct
a 2-equilibrium s. For every matched node v ∈ V (M), choose the color corre-
sponding to the adjacent matching edge. On the unmatched nodes in V and
nodes of the form vi0, we assign colors in such a way that every gadget has one
Gvi0{a, c} ∪ {x
i
v | v ∈ V }
vi1
{a, b}
vi2
{b, c}
ui
{b}
Hi
3
4 3
2
3
Fig. 1. The gadget Hi.
outgoing edge (indicated by the dashed edge) that is unicolor. This is possible
because there are at least n− 2l unmatched nodes in V . If there are uncolored
nodes in V left, assign arbitrary colors to them. Finally, let vi1 and v
i
2 choose
color b for every i. We claim that s is a 2-equilibrium: The matched nodes ob-
tain a payoff of 4, which is the maximal payoff nodes in V can get; so they are
not part of any improving deviation. Let v ∈ V be unmatched. Then v cannot
deviate together with another unmatched node to increase the payoff because
M is maximal. Further, all gadget nodes are ‘taken’: every vi0 has a payoff of 3,
which a joint deviation with v cannot increase. This implies that v cannot be
part of any improving deviation. Lastly, it is easy to see that pairs of gadget
nodes cannot profitably deviate. This proves that s is a 2-equilibrium.
Conversely, assume that a joint strategy s is a 2-equilibrium. LetM consist of
the unicolor edges in G. By the choice of the color assignment,M is a matching.
M is maximal because if there were two unmatched adjacent nodes, then they
could form a profitable deviating coalition. It remains to show that |M | ≤ l. It is
not hard to see that if there is a gadget without an outgoing unicolor edge, then
there is a 2-improving deviation in Hi. So at least n − 2l nodes choose gadget
colors, implying that |V (M)| ≤ 2l and thus |M | ≤ l. ⊓⊔
On the positive side, we can compute a strong equilibrium in polynomial
time if the underlying graph is a tree.
Theorem 7. Let G be a graph coordination game on a tree. Then there is a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute a strong equilibrium.
Proof (sketch). The idea is as follows: We fix an arbitrary root r of the tree and
consider the induced sequential-move game. This game has a subgame perfect
equilibrium s which can be computed in polynomial time by backwards induc-
tion. Let s¯ be the corresponding joint strategy of G if every player plays his best
response according to s. We can prove that s¯ is a strong equilibrium of G.
Example 1 in the appendix shows that, unfortunately, the idea above does
not extend to polymatrix coordination games.
6 Coordination mechanisms
In this section, we investigate means that a central designer could use to reduce
the inefficiency of Nash equilibria.
In our games the common payoff qij of the bimatrix game on edge {i, j} ∈ E
is distributed equally to both i and j. An idea that arises is to use different
payoff sharing rules to reduce the inefficiency. Unfortunately, it turns out that
the price of anarchy remains unbounded no matter which payoff sharing rule is
used (details are given in the appendix).
We therefore consider another natural approach. Suppose the central designer
can impose strategies on a subset of the players to reduce the inefficiency. Let G
be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. Further, let K ⊆ N be a subset of the
players and fix a joint strategy fK ∈ SK for players in K. We define G[fK ] as
the game with players from N \K that arises from G if we fix the strategies of
all players in K according to fK . We say that fK guarantees social welfare z if
SW(fK , s−K) ≥ z for all Nash equilibria s−K of G[fK ]. We also call fK a joint
strategy of size |K|.
Suppose that fK guarantees social welfare z. Then once all players in G[fK ]
have reached a Nash equilibrium we can release all players in K and let them
play their best responses too. By Theorem 1, the social welfare can only increase
subsequently. As a result, the final Nash equilibrium has social welfare at least
z. So we can view fK as a ‘temporary advice’ for the players in K. A similar
idea has been put forward in [6].
We first show that determining the minimum number of players to guarantee
a certain social welfare is hard, even for graph coordination games.
Theorem 8. Let G be a graph coordination game. Given a joint strategy strategy
s, the problem of finding a minimal k such that there is a joint strategy fK of
size k that guarantees social welfare SW(s) is NP-hard. The claim also holds if
fK is restricted to be sK .
In light of the above hardness results, we resort to approximation algorithms.
Theorem 9. Let G be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. Given a joint strat-
egy s and a number k, we can find in polynomial time a coalition K of size k
such that sK guarantees welfare
k
nSW(s) and this is tight.
Using the 2-approximation algorithm for the social welfare optimization prob-
lem in [12], we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let G be a polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. where the bimatrix
game of every edge has positive entries on the diagonal only . Given a number
k, we can compute a joint strategy fK of size K that guarantees a
k
2n fraction
of the optimal social welfare.
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Fig. 2. The edges are labeled with their respective bimatrix payoffs when every player
supports player n− 1.
A Missing proofs of Section 3
Proof (Theorem 1, Claim 1). We show that G admits an exact potential. We
can decompose G into a game G1 in which player i’s payoff is qi and a polyma-
trix coordination game G2 in which player i receives payoff
∑
j∈Ni
qij . Clearly,∑
i∈N q
i(s) is an exact potential for G1. Further, it is known that half the social
welfare is an exact potential for G2; see [9]. Thus
Φ(s) :=
∑
i∈N
qi(s) +
1
2
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni
qij(s) =
∑
i∈N
qi(s) +
∑
{i,j}∈E
qij(s)
is an exact potential for G. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 2). Denote by ⊕ (resp. ⊖) the addition (resp. subtraction) mod-
ulo n−1. Consider the following polymatrix coordination game on n players. For
convenience we assume here that the set of players is given as N = {1, . . . , n−1}.
The strategy set of player i is Si = N . One way to think of this is that every
player may choose another player to support (including himself). For two players
i 6= j, we define the bimatrix game qij is as follows. If i and j both support j,
they get 2i⊖j . So both get 2n−2 if ‘i is j’s left neighbor’, 2n−3 if ‘i is j’s second
left neighbor’, and so on. Similarly, if i and j both choose i, they get 2j⊖i. In all
other cases, qij(si, sj) = 0. Figure 2 depicts the bimatrix payoffs if all players
support player n− 1.
For i = 0, . . . , n−1, let si be the strategy profile in which player i⊕1 supports
himself and all other players support player i. Let Ki = N \ {i}. We claim that
sn−1 →Kn−1 sn−2 →Kn−2 . . . →K2 s1 →K1 s0 = sn−1
is a cycle of α-improving deviations, where α = 2− 12n−3 .
By symmetry, it is enough to show that sn−1 →Kn−1 sn−2 is α-improving.
Note that indeed, sn−1 and sn−2 only differ in the strategies of Kn−1 = N \
{n − 1}. The payoffs in sn−1 are as follows. Player 0 gets 0 because he is the
only one supporting himself. Players 0 < i < n− 1 get qi,n−1(n− 1, n− 1) = 2i
from supporting n− 1. Finally, player n− 1 gets ∑n−2i=1 2i = 2n−1 − 2.
v0{x, z}
v2
{y, z}
v1
{x, y}
u3
{x}
u1
{y}
u2
{z}
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
1
1
1
Fig. 3. A graph coordination game with no α-approximate 2-equilibrium for every
α < ϕ.
In sn−1, every player i 6= n − 1 gets the utility that i + 1 previously got.
For all players in Kn−1 except n − 2, this is at least twice her previous utility.
Player n− 2 improves her utility by (2n−1 − 2)/2n−2 = α. So sn−1 →Kn−1 sn−2
is indeed an α-improving joint deviation.
Letting n go to infinity, this proves the theorem for arbitrary α < 2. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 3). The first claim follows from Theorem 7.
For the second claim consider the graph coordination game depicted in Figure
3. We argue that there is no (α, 2)-equilibrium for every α < ϕ. Suppose there
is one and call it s. Then by definition of the color sets, only one of the edges
in the triangle can be unicolor. By symmetry, we assume it is {v0, v1}. We can
assume sv2 = z (if sv2 = y, v1 can profitably deviate). Then the joint deviation
of K = {v1, v2} to y yields a payoff increase of ϕ > α (for v2) and 1+ϕϕ = ϕ > α
(for v1). So s is not an α-approximate 2-equilibrium. ⊓⊔
B Missing proofs of Section 4
Proof (Theorem 4, lower bounds). We first prove that the α-approximate strong
price of anarchy is at least 2α for the class of graph coordination games.
Consider the graph coordination game depicted in Figure 4.
v1
{a}
v2
{a, b}
v3
{c, b}
v4
{c}
α 1 α
Fig. 4.
The strategy profile in which v2 and v3 choose b is an α-approximate strong
equilibrium with social welfare 2, while the optimum (in which they choose a
and c, resp.) achieves 4α.
Next, we show that for graph coordination games and all n ≥ k > 1 the
α-approximate k-price of anarchy is at least
2α
(n− 1
k − 1 − 1
)
+ 1
The α-approximate price of anarchy is ∞ [2].
Fix n and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let N consist of two sets V1 and V2 of size k and n−k,
respectively, and define
E = {{u, v} | u ∈ V1, v ∈ V1 ∪ V2}.
We give the edges in E[V1] weight 1 and the edges between V1 and V2 weight α.
Fix three colors a, b and c. For v ∈ V1, let Sv = {a, c}. For v ∈ V2, let
Sv = {b, c}. Then the color assignment σ in which each player chooses the
common color c is a social optimum. The social welfare is
SW(σ) = k(k − 1) + 2αk(n− k) = k(k − 1 + 2α((n− 1)− (k − 1))).
Next we show that the color assignment s in which every node in V1 chooses
a and every node in V2 chooses b is a k-equilibrium. Assume that there is a
profitable deviation s→K s′ such that |K| ≤ k. Then all nodes in K switch to c
and all nodes that choose c in s′ are in K. So for all v ∈ K, pv(s′) = |Nv∩K|. So
there is v ∈ V1 ∩K because otherwise the payoff of all nodes in K would remain
0. But then pv(s
′) = |Nv∩K| ≤ α(k−1) = αpv(s), which yields a contradiction.
Note that SW(s) = k(k − 1).
It follows that the α-approximate k-price of anarchy is unbounded if k = 1
and at least
SW(σ)
SW(s)
=
2α((n− 1)− (k − 1)) + k − 1
k − 1 = 2α
(
n− 1
k − 1 − 1
)
+ 1
for k > 1. ⊓⊔
C Missing proofs of Section 5
A crucial insight to prove the first part of the theorem is that it is sufficient to
consider deviations that are simple: We call a deviation s →K s′ simple if the
subgraph G[K] induced by K is connected and all nodes in K deviate to the
same color, i.e., s′ = (xK , s−K) for some x ∈M .
Lemma 1. Let s→K s′ be an (α, k)-improving deviation from s. Then there is
also a simple such deviation.
Proof. Let s→K s′ be an α-improving deviation with |K| ≤ k. Pick an arbitrary
v ∈ K and let x = s′v. Let L consist of those nodes u ∈ K for which s′u = x and
u is reachable in G[K] from v. Let s′′ = (xL, s−L). For all nodes u ∈ L,
pu(s
′′) = w({u, v} ∈ E | s′′v = x}) ≥ w({u, v} ∈ E | s′v = x}) = pu(s′) > αpu(s),
where for the first inequality we use the fact that all neighbors of u playing x in
s′ also do so in s′′ by choice of L. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof (Theorem 5, k = O(1)). By Lemma 1, it is enough to check for all colors x
and all coalitions K ⊆ {v ∈ N | x ∈ Sv} of size at most k whether the deviation
to x is α-improving. For each coalition of size at most k, this takes time O(mk)
and we check O(nk) such coalitions. So we need O(mnkk) time in total. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 5, k = n). We show that the problem can be reduced to the
following MinDegree problem: Given a graph G = (V,E) together with non-
negative numbers dv for all nodes v ∈ V , find the inclusionwise maximal K ⊆ V
such that for every v ∈ K, w({{v, j} ∈ E | j ∈ K}) > dv. It is not hard to see
that a simple greedy algorithm solves the MinDegree problem in polynomial
time (see Theorem 10 below for details).
The idea now is to use this algorithm to find an inclusionwise maximal coali-
tion K such that s →K (xK , s−K) is α-improving. To this aim, consider the
graph G′ = (N ′, E′) induced by the set of vertices that can choose x but do not
do so in s. Let
dv = αpv(s)− w({{v, j} ∈ E | sj = x})− qv(x)
for v ∈ N ′. Fix a coalition K ⊆ N ′. Then for each v ∈ K, jointly deviating
to (xK , s−K) is profitable iff the weight of its incident edges in the induced
subgraph (K, {{v, w} ∈ E | v, w ∈ K}) is more than dv. Indeed,
pv(xK , s−K) = q
v(x) + w({{v, j} ∈ E | j ∈ K})
+ w({{v, j} ∈ E | sj = x})
> αpv(s)
if and only if w({{v, j} ∈ E | j ∈ K}) > dv. So the problem reduces to finding
the inclusionwise maximal solution of MinDegree.
Now the claim immediately follows: Let a joint strategy s be given. For all
colors x ∈ M , we compute the inclusionwise maximal Kx such that s →Kx
(xK , s−K) is α-improving. If there is a Kx such that Kx 6= ∅, s is not an α-
approximate strong equilibrium. Otherwise, there is no simple α-improving de-
viation. So s is an α-approximate strong equilibrium by Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
Theorem 10. MinDegree can be solved efficiently.
Proof. Note that the empty set satisfies the degree conditions, so a solution
always exists. Furthermore, for K,K ′ ⊆ N that satisfy the degree conditions,
K ∪K ′ also satisfies them. So there is a unique inclusionwise maximal K.
Consider the following algorithm:
1. Initialize K = N .
2. For each v ∈ K, check if w({{v, j} | j ∈ K}) > dv and, if not, remove v from
K.
3. If a node has been removed in the last iteration of Step 2, repeat Step 2.
Otherwise stop and output K.
In every iteration of Step 2 except the last one a node is removed. So this
algorithm runs in time O(n(n+m)).
We now show correctness. Let K be as in the final state of the algorithm.
Then w({{v, j} | j ∈ K}) > dv for all v ∈ K because otherwise another node
would have been removed.
Now we show inclusionwise maximality. Suppose some K ′ ⊆ N satisfies
w({{v, j} | j ∈ K}) > dv. for all v ∈ K ′. We claim that at each step of the
algorithm, K ′ ⊆ K: K ′ ⊆ K is true at the beginning of the algorithm. Consider
an iteration of Step 2 and suppose K ′ ⊆ K holds at the beginning. Suppose
some v ∈ K ′ is removed in this iteration, and pick v to be the first node of K ′
that is removed. Then at this state, degG[K](v) ≥ degG[K′](v) > dv and thus v
is not removed, a contradiction. This shows the claim. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 5, α fixed). This proof uses the same idea as [2, Theorem 9]. It
is easy to verify that the problem is in co-NP: a certificate of a NO-instance is
an α-improving deviation of a coalition of size at most k.
We show the hardness by reduction of the complement of Clique, which is a
co-NP-complete problem. Let (G, k) be an instance thereof, with G = (V,E). For
v ∈ V let Sv = {xv, y}, where the colors xv are pairwise distinct. Furthermore,
for every node v ∈ V we add a node uv and edges {v, uv} of weight k − 2. This
additional node can only choose the color xv. We give the edges in E weight α.
Let s be the joint strategy in which every node v ∈ V chooses xv. We claim that
this is an α-approximate k-equilibrium if and only if G has no clique of size k.
Suppose G has a clique K of size k. Then jointly deviating to y yields to each
node in K a payoff of α(k − 1), whereas every node has a payoff of k − 2 in s.
So this is an α-improving deviation. For the other direction, suppose that there
is a profitable deviation s→K s′ by a coalition K of size at most k. Then every
node in K deviates to y and hence belongs to V. Since every node in K has a
payoff of k− 2 in s, pv(s′) > α(k− 2) for all v ∈ K. So v is connected to at least
k− 1 nodes in K. Since K is of size at most k, this implies that K is a clique of
size k. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof (Theorem 6, k ≥ 2). The problems are in NP because the corresponding
verification problems are in P, as shown in Theorem 5.
Consider an instance (G, l) of Minimum Maximal Matching, and let G be
the weighted coordination game constructed in Theorem 6. We claim that every
2-equilibrium is also a strong equilibrium. Then G has a maximal matching of
size at most k iff G has a strong equilibrium iff G has a k-equilibrium, showing
NP-hardness of both problems.
Let s be a 2-equilibrium of G. Assume that there is a profitable deviation
s →K s′. By Lemma 1, we can assume that K is connected and all nodes in K
can choose a common color which is different from the ones they choose under
s. But this means that |K| = 2 by construction of G. So s is not a 2-equilibrium,
a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof (Theorem 7). Assume w.l.o.g. that G is connected, i.e., is a tree. We can
furthermore assume that G is without individual preferences by adding dummy
nodes to ‘simulate’ the players’ individual preferences: We add a node vx,i for
each color x and original player i, which we connect to i by an edge of weight
qi(x), and thus get a new graph coordination game G′ without individual pref-
erences. This preserves strong equilibria and the fact that G is a tree.
Fix an ordering of G with root r. For each node v ∈ V let Cv ⊆ V denote
the set of children of v and let Pv ∈ V denote the parent of v (if v 6= r). Let Tv
denote the subtree of G rooted at v.
Consider the sequential-move game G if the players choose their strategies
according to the ordering of G, starting at the root. Then this game has a
subgame perfect equilibrium s which can be computed in polynomial time by
backwards induction. For a player v, denote by s[v → x] the joint strategy of
the subtree Tv implemented under s if v plays x ∈ Sv. For u ∈ Tv, let su[v → x]
denote the color u chooses under s[v → x]. For y ∈ SPv and σ ∈ STv , let pv(y, σ)
be the payoff of v if Pv plays y and nodes in Tv play according to σ. Let s¯ denote
the joint strategy that is implemented with respect to s.
Note that the condition of s being a subgame perfect equilibrium can then be
written as follows: For all players v and colors x ∈ SPv , choosing y = sv[Pv → x]
maximizes pv(x, s[v → y]) among y ∈ Sv.
Assume for a contradiction that there is a profitable deviation s¯ →K s′ in
the original game G. By Lemma 1, we can assume this deviation to be simple,
i.e., K is connected and all players in K deviate to the same color x. Let v be
the root of K.
Claim 1. For all u ∈ Tv, s′u = x implies su[Pu → x] = x, i.e., if u chooses x in
s′, then he in particular chooses it in s if his parent does so.
Proof. For u /∈ K, this is easy to see: if s¯Pu = x, the claim trivially holds because
su[Pu → x] = s¯u = s′u = x. If, on the other hand, s¯Pu 6= x, the reasoning goes
as follows. The fact that s¯u = s
′
u = x implies that it is a best response for u to
play x if Pu plays s¯Pu . If Pu plays x instead of s¯Pu , then x is the only strategy
of u that yields a better payoff than before in s. So x is the only best response
to Pu playing x.
Now, we show the claim for u ∈ K. We can assume that the claim holds for
all children of u. Assume for a contradiction that su[Pu → x] = y 6= x.
Because s is a subgame perfect equilibrium,
pu(s¯) = pu(s¯Pu , s[u→ s¯u]) ≥ pu(s¯Pu , s[u→ y]).
Since x 6= y,
pu(s¯Pu , s[u→ y]) ≥ pu(x, s[u→ y])
Next, since y is a best response to x,
pu(x, s[u→ y]) ≥ pu(x, s[u→ x])
Since the claim holds for all children of u, all children of u choosing x in s′
also do so in s[u→ x] and thus contribute to the utility of u. So
pu(x, s[u→ x]) ≥ pu(x, s′Tu).
Because s′u = x, we have
pu(x, s
′
Tu) ≥ pu(s′).
Putting together the sequence of inequalities, we get pu(s¯) ≥ pu(s′), a con-
tradiction to u ∈ K. ⊓⊔
Claim 2. For the root v of K it holds that pv(s
′) ≤ pv(s¯).
Proof. Because s′v = x, it follows from Claim 1 that all children of v choosing x
under s also do so in s[v → x]. Furthermore, the strategy of Pv is the same in s¯
and s′ because v is the root of K. Thus
pv(s
′) = pv(s¯Pv , s
′
Tv) ≤ pv(s¯Pv , s[v → x]).
But
pv(s¯Pv , s[v → x]) ≤ pv(s¯Pv , s[v → s¯v]) = pv(s¯)
because s is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Together this implies pv(s
′) ≤ pv(s¯).
⊓⊔
This is a contradiction: v should have profited from the deviation to s′. Thus s¯
is indeed a strong equilibrium. ⊓⊔
The following example shows that in polymatrix coordination games this idea
does not work: The joint strategy implemented in a subgame perfect equilibrium
is not even necessarily a Nash equilibrium.
Example 1. We consider a polymatrix coordination game with individual pref-
erences. The result then extends to polymatrix coordination games without in-
dividual preferences by introducing dummy nodes.
Consider the polymatrix coordination game w.i.p. on two nodes u and v, both
of which can choose two strategies ‘coordinate’ (cu and cv) and ‘play selfishly’
(su and sv). The payoffs q
uv are as follows: If both players coordinate, they get
4; if v plays selfishly, they get 0 no matter what u does; if u plays selfishly and v
coordinates, they get 2. Furthermore, both players have a preference for playing
selfishly, namely qu(su) = 3, q
u(cu) = 0 and similarly q
v(sv) = 3, q
v(cv) = 0.
Now, consider the sequential move game in which u moves first. If u coordi-
nates, it is a best response for v to coordinate, resulting in a payoff of 4 for both.
If u plays selfishly, v responds by playing selfishly too, resulting in a payoff of 3
for both. So u plays cu in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and the imple-
mented strategies are (cu, cv). But this is not a Nash equilibrium because u can
profitably defect by playing su and getting a utility of q
u(su) + q
uv(su, cv) = 5.
⊓⊔
D Missing proofs of Section 6
In our games the common payoff qij of the bimatrix game on edge {i, j} ∈ E
is distributed equally to both i and j. An idea that arises is to use different
payoff sharing rules to reduce the inefficiency. More specifically, suppose we fix
for each edge {i, j} shares qiji and qijj (summing up to 2qij) that players i and
j obtain, respectively, when playing the bimatrix game on {i, j}. The following
example shows that asymmetric payoff sharing rules are too weak to reduce the
inefficiency, even in graph coordination games.
Example 2. We review the example given in the Introduction in the context of
payoff sharing rules. Recall that in this game we are given an arbitrary graph
with unit edge weights and every player i ∈ N can choose between a private
color ci and a common color c. Now, no matter how the weight of 1 of each
edge is shared among its endpoints, the joint strategy s = (ci)i∈N is a Nash
equilibrium. Thus the price of anarchy remains unbounded. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 8). For the first claim: We show this by reduction from Min-
imum Vertex Cover. Let an instance of this problem be given, i.e., a graph
G = (V,E) and a number k. We construct a new graph G′ as follows. We
start with G and divide each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E into two edges {u, ve}
and {ve, v} (where ve is a new node corresponding to e). The set of colors is
M = {cv | v ∈ V }∪ {pv | v ∈ V } ∪ {p}. For every node v ∈ V , set Sv = {pv, cv},
and for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E set Sve = {cu, cv, p}. Intuitively, the c-colors
are common colors that favor coordination and the p-colors are private colors.
Call the constructed coordination game G.
We claim that G has a vertex cover of size k if and only if there is a joint
strategy sK of size k that forces 2|E|. Note that 2|E| is the maximum payoff in
G and is achieved iff all nodes ve have a payoff of 1.
Let a vertex cover C of G be given. We fix all nodes v ∈ C to play fv := cv.
Let s be a Nash equilibrium in G[fC ]. Then all nodes ve corresponding to edges
in G can achieve a payoff of 1. So SW(s) ≥ 2|E|.
u v
u
{cu, pu}
ve
{cu, cv , p}
v
{cu, pv}
e
Fig. 5. Dividing an edge.
Conversely, suppose fK of size k forces 2|E|. We show that the set
C := {v ∈ V | ∃u ∈ K : fK = cu}
with |C| ≤ k is a vertex cover of G. Suppose that this is not the case. Then
there exists an edge e = {u, v} ∈ E such that no node in V ′ is forced to choose
cu or cv. We construct a bad Nash equilibrium of G[fK ] by starting at a joint
strategy s and playing best responses. Let all nodes in V \K choose their private
color in s. Then at no point it is beneficial for any node to switch to cu or cv
because no other node plays either of these colors. So the payoff of ve in the
Nash equilibrium is 0 and the Nash equilibrium achieves a social welfare of less
than 2|E|, a contradiction.
For the last two claims: We reuse the construction above. Let s∗ be such that
s∗v = cv for all v ∈ V and ve chooses either cu or cv for e = {u, v}. Note that s∗
is optimal with social welfare 2|E| and in the construction of fK in the previous
theorem we only forced nodes to choose s∗. So the Minimum Vertex Cover
instance admits a vertex cover of size k iff the solution of Problem 2 is at most
k iff G iff the solution of Problem 3 is at most k. This shows that Minimum
Vertex Cover is reducible to either of these problems. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 9). Let G be a strategic game and s′ a joint strategy. Then G
is called (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to s′ [16] if for all joint strategies s,∑
v∈V
pv(s
′
v, s−v) ≥ λSW(s′) + µSW(s).
It was shown5 in [16] that if G is (λ, µ)-smooth w.r.t. s′, then the social welfare
of all coarse correlated equilibria is at least λ1−µSW(s
′).
Let K consist of the k players with the highest payoff in s′. We show that
G[s′K ] is ( kn , 0)-smooth with respect to s′.
Let s be an arbitrary strategy profile in G[s′K ]. For all v ∈ V ,
pv(s
′
v, s−v) ≥ qv(s′) +
∑
j∈K,j 6=v
qvj(s′).
5 To be precise, [16] assumes s′ to be arbitrary, but his proof ideas extend to the result
stated above.
It follows that
∑
v∈V
pv(s
′
v, s−v) ≥
∑
v∈N
qv(s′) +
∑
v∈N
∑
j∈K,j 6=v
qvj
≥
∑
j∈K
(
qj(s′) +
∑
v∈N,v 6=j
qvj
)
=
∑
k∈K
pv(s
′).
Because we chose K to consist of the k nodes with highest payoff w.r.t. s′, this
is at least knSW(s
′). So G[s′K ] is indeed ( kn , 0)-smooth w.r.t. s′.
Now, we show tightness in the above stated sense. Let k be given. We
construct an unweighted graph coordination game on the complete graph on
n = 2k+1 nodes. Every node can choose the colors a and b. Let s∗ be the social
optimum in which every player plays a. Suppose we force a coalition K of size k
to play fK . Let the rest of the nodes play in such a way that k nodes choose a
and the rest chooses b. It is easy to see that this is a Nash equilibrium of social
welfare k(k − 1) + (k + 1)k = 2k2. The optimal social welfare is SW(s∗) = 2nk.
The claim follows. ⊓⊔
